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WHITE v. McGINNIS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
EXPANDS CIVIL JURY TRIAL WAIVER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In White v. McGinnis,l the Ninth Circuit held that a civil 
litigant's knowing participation in a bench trial without objec-
tion constituted waiver of a timely jury demand.2 This case over-
ruled Palmer v. United States3 in which the Ninth Circuit de-
termined that acquiesence to a bench trial did not constitute 
waiver of a jury trial demand. 4 This article will examine the 
Ninth Circuit's rejection of the literal statutory language of civil 
jury trial waiver under Rules 38(d)6 and 39(a)6 of the Federal 
1. White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1990)(en banc)(per Hall, J.; the other 
panel members were Goodwin, C. J., Browning, J., Wallace, J., Hug, J., Schroeder, J., 
Fletcher, Brunetti, J., and Fernandez, J.; Alarcon, J., concurring; Kozinski, J., dissenting, 
with whom Schroeder, J., and Fletcher, J. joined). 
2. White, 903 F.2d at 700. 
3. 652 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1981)(acquiesence to a bench trial did not waive the right 
to a jury trial where a timely demand was never properly withdrawn by oral or written 
stipulation in accordance with FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d) and 39(a». In Palmer the Ninth 
Circuit refused to deviate from the explicit language of Rules 38(d) and 39(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The language of these Rules require that once a jury 
demand in a civil action has been properly asserted, it may only be withdrawn by written 
stipulation or by oral stipulation in open court. Id. See infra notes 5-6. 
4. Palmer, 652 F.2d at 896. 
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d) provides: 
Waiver. The failure of a party to serve a demand as required 
by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a 
waiver by the party of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury 
made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the 
consent of the parties. 
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a) provides: 
By Jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as provided 
in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the docket as a 
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Rules of Civil Procedure. 
II. FACTS 
In June, 1984, Edward Allen White, an Arizona State Prison 
inmate,' filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,8 against 
Wayne McGinnis, an Arizona State Department of Corrections 
employee.9 White alleged that McGinnis assaulted him during a 
cellblock search, violating his eighth amendment rights. 1o White 
made a timely demand for a jury trial,11 but the court subse-
quently notified the parties that the case was set for a bench 
trial.I 2 
During the five and one-half month period between the 
bench trial notice and the trial, White failed to bring his jury 
demand to the district court's attention.13 White also failed to 
object to the absence of a jury during the bench trial, all the 
jury, unless (1) the parties or their attorneys of record, by 
written stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipula· 
tion made in open court and entered in the record, consent to 
trial by the court sitting without a jury or (2) the court upon 
motion or of its own initiative finds that a right of trial by jury 
of some or all of those issues does not exist under the Consti· 
tution or statutes of the United States. 
7. White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1990). White initially proceeded in 
pro se, but retained private counsel who entered an appearance on Aug. 30, 1985. ld. at 
700 n.1. 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1991): 
Civil action for deprivation of rights. Every person who, under 
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac· 
tion at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress. For 
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable 
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to 
be a statute of the District of Columbia. 
9. White, 903 F.2d at 700. 
10. ld. U.S. CONST. amend. Vili provides: "Excessive hail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." 
11. White, 903 F.2d at 700. McGinnis did not dispute that White was entitled to a 
jury trial on his claims. ld. at 700 n.2. 
12. ld. at 700. Before counsel was retained, the court informed the parties on Aug. 6, 
1985 that a bench trial would take place on Jan. 21, 1986. Jd. 
13. ld. 
2
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while his counsel vigorously argued the case to the judge.14 
Moreover, after the verdict was entered in favor of McGinnis, 
White neither notified the district court of its procedural error 
before it entered judgment against him, nor filed a motion for a 
new trial after judgment. Hi 
On appeal, White contended that a jury trial was required, 
relying on Palmer v. United States,16 which held that the jury 
trial right is fundamental and every presumption must be made 
against its waiver.!' In response, the defendant argued that 
White should be barred from raising the issue on appeal because 
it was not previously addressed before the district court. 18 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY FOUNDATION 
The right to a civil jury trial under U.S. CONST. amend. 
VII,19 or as specified by a federal statute, shall be preserved to 
the parties inviolate.20 To determine whether the right to a civil 
jury trial exists, courts have adopted an historical test.21 Specifi-
cally, if the right to a civil jury trial existed 200 years ago at 
common law22 when the Constitution was adopted, the right still 
14. ld. 
15. ld. 
16. 652 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1981). 
17. White, 903 F.2d at 700 (citing Palmer v. United States, 652 F.2d 893, 896 (9th 
Cir. 1981». White also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. However, Nicholson v. 
Rushen, 767 F.2d 1426, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985)(per curiam), held that a plaintiff in a section 
1983 action who alleged excessive use of force had no right to such a claim. White, 903 
F.2d at 700. 
18. White, 903 F.2d at 700 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Weigel, 426 F.2d 
1356, 1357 (9th Cir. 1970)(per curiam». The rule generally applied on appeal is that 
errors asserted below will not be considered when the issue was not first raised in the 
trial court. The rationale behind this rule is that the error might have been avoided had 
it been raised first at the trial court level. 1 d. 
19. U.S. CONST. amend VII established the right to a civil jury trial: "In suits at 
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right to 
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-ex-
amined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of common law." 
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a) provides: "Right Preserved. The right of trial by jury as 
declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the 
United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate." 
21. J. LANDERS. J. MARTIN & S. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE, at 705 (2d ed. 1988)[here-
inafter CIVIL PROCEDURE]. 
22. See CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 21, at 705-06. Separate courts of law and eq-
3
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exists.23 
Pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, any party may demand a civil jury trial on any issue tria-
ble of right by a jury.24 The party must serve a written demand 
upon the other parties after the lawsuit is filed. 2 & However, the 
demand cannot be filed more than ten days after service of the 
last pleading that addressed legal issues which gave rise to the 
jury trial right.26 If a party fails to serve a demand27 and file it,28 
the right to a civil jury trial is waived.29 However, the demand 
may not be withdrawn except by consent of the parties. so 
Furthermore, Rule 39(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides that when a jury trial has been demanded, the 
uity existed .originally at c.omm.on law. Since plaintiff .or defendant had a jury trial in 
acti.ons at law, but n.ot in equity, the jury trial right is preserved .only in acti.ons at law. 
Alth.ough the distincti.on between law and equity jurisdicti.on was never abs.olute (e.g., 
the "clean up" d.octrine permitted an equity c.ourt t.o decide issues that .ordinarily W.ould 
have been decided by a jury in an acti.on at law), the m.odern distincti.on has bec.ome less 
clear with the merger .of law and equity and the creati.on .of new causes .of acti.on in 
reSP.onse t.o a s.ocial and P.olitical .order that is m.ore c.omplex than in 1791. [d. at 703-05. 
In additi.on, the reas.onableness .of all.owing the exercise .of the right t.o a jury trial in 
c.omplex cases has been called int.o questi.on. [d. 
23. Beac.on Theatres, Inc. v. West.over, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959)(legal claims must be 
tried first t.o a jury when there are equitable claims by the plaintiff and legal defenses 
and c.ounterclaims by the defendant). 
24. FED. R. elv. P. 38(b). See supra n.ote 22 f.or a m.ore c.omplete discussi.on of which 
issues have right-to-jury-trial guarantees. 
25. FED, R. elV, P. 38(b). 
26. FED, R. elV, p, 38(b) pr.ovides: 
Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue 
triable .of right by a jury by serving UP.on the .other parties a 
demand therefor in writing at any time after the c.ommence-
ment .of the action and n.ot later than 10 days after the service 
of the last pleading directed t.o such issue. Such demand may 
be ind.orsed UP.on a pleading of the party. 
27. FED, R. elV, p, 38(d) provides that a party demanding a civil jury trial must 
serve notice .on .oPP.osing counsel and file a C.oPy .of the demand with the c.ourt clerk 
pursuant t.o FED, R. elV, p, 5(d). See supra n.ote 5. 
28. FED, R. eiV. p, 5(d) provides: 
All papers ... shall be filed with the c.ourt either bef.ore ser-
vice .or within a reas.onable time thereafter, but the c.ourt may 
.on m.oti.on of a party or .on its own initiative .order that dep.osi-
ti.ons UP.on .oral examinati.on and interr.ogat.ories, requests fur 
d.ocuments, requests f.or admissi.on, and answers and reSP.onses 
theret.o n.ot be tiled unless .on .order .of the c.ourt or f.or use in 
the pr.oceeding, 
29. FED, R. elY, p, 38(d). See supra note 5 f.or expressed language. 
30. FED, R. elY. p, 38(d). 
4
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action shall be designated on the court docket as a jury action.31 
In addition, unless a written stipulation to waive the jury trial is 
filed with the court, or an oral stipulation is made in open court 
on the record, all issues demanded to be tried by jury shall be so 
tried.32 The court may also find that a right to jury trial on some 
or all of the issues does not exist under the Constitution or stat-
utes of the United States.33 
B. RAISING ISSUES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON ApPEAL 
Strong policies normally preclude a civil litigant from rais-
ing the jury trial entitlement issue for the first time on appeal. S4 
For example, the Seventh Circuit in Lovelace v. Dall determined 
that it is unfair to permit a party to have a trial, discover it has 
lost, and then because the result is unsatisfactory raise the jury 
trial issue. 3~ 
However, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Gabriel,36 
decided that it may review "an issue conceded or neglected be-
low if the issue is purely one of law and the pertinent record has 
been fully developed."37 Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit identi-
fied several other exceptions which allow it discretion to hear an 
issue not raised below. In Bolker v. Commissioner,3s the court 
recognized three narrow exceptions: (1) when review is necessary 
to prevent a miscarriage of justice; (2) while appeal is pending 
and a new issue arises because of a change in the law; or (3) 
when the issue is purely one of law and does not require further 
factual record.39 
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a). See supra note 6 for expressed language. 
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a). 
33. Id. This determination may be made upon motion or sua sponte. Id. 
34. See, e.g., Lovelace v. DaB, 820 F.2d 223, 228 (7th Cir. 1987)(per 
curiam)(objection waived if not timely made; issues cannot be raised on appeal if not 
raised first in district court). The principal concern is judicial economy; court judgments 
should have meaning and effect instead of being a futile exercise where one party can 
overturn the verdict no matter what the result. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. 625 F.2d 830, 831 (9th Cir. 1980)(government permitted to raise for the first 
time on appeal whether the Border Patrol's two stops of defendant's vehicles constituted 
"fixed checkpoint stops" in a prosecution involving the transport of illegal aliens). 
37. Gabriel, 625 F.2d at 832. 
38. 760 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985)(as a general rule, court of appeals will not consider 
an issue for the first time on appeal, although it has the power to do so). 
39. Bolker, 760 F.2d at 1042. 
5
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C. PALMER REQUIRED SPECIFIC CONDUCT To EVINCE JURY 
WAIVER 
In Palmer v. United States40 a timely jury trial demand was 
made but the district court proceeded with a bench trial.41 The 
jury trial issue emerged on appeal even though objection had not 
been made to the district court's failure to acknowledge the jury 
demand.42 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the jury demand was 
not properly withdrawn because an oral or written stipulation to 
withdraw was not made as Rule 39(a)48 expressly required, and 
without more, the right to object was not withdrawn by submit-
ting to a bench trial." However, the Ninth Circuit did not hold 
that a formal stipulation was the only device for the parties to 
waive a prior jury trial demand.41i Rather, the court concluded 
that "[c]onduct of the parties which evinces consent and appears 
on the record is sufficient to constitute a proper withdrawal and 
waiver."46 Since the record was completely silent on the matter, 
the Ninth Circuit found no waiver.47 
The Ninth Circuit in Palmer relied upon extra-jurisdic-
tional law from the Fourth and Second Circuits for its literal 
application of Rule 39(a).48 In Millner v. Norfolk & Western 
Railway,49 the Fourth Circuit held that even though objection 
40. 652 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1981). 
41. Palmer, 652 F.2d at 895. 
42. [d. 
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a). See supra note 6 for the expressed language. 
44. Palmer, 652 F.2d at 896. The court also found that the driver was entitled to a 
jury trial under the seventh amendment. Even though the issue of contribution was an 
equitable issue, the Government's claim against the driver required determination of the 
extent to which the driver's negligence contributed to plaintiff's injuries. It was also nec-
essary to determine the relative fault between the driver and the Government, and 
whether the Government had in fact satisfied the judgment against it in plaintiff's origi-





49. 643 F.2d 1005 (4th Cir. 1981)(right to jury trial or withdrawal of timely jury 
demand was not waived by plaintiff's participation in evidentiary hearing before the 
court, notwithstanding want of express objection). The Fourth Circuit found that aside 
from the fact that the technical requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 39 were not met, a waiver 
could not be implied on general equitable principles because the motion was one "to 
6
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was not made, a jury trial was not waived by a plaintiff's partici-
pation in an evidentiary hearing before the district court.1IO 
There, the court held that under the circumstances, plaintiff 
could not be fairly charged with notice that dispositive issues of 
fact on which he had demanded a jury trial were to be adjudi-
cated by the court. 111 
The Second Circuit, in Rosen u. Dick,1I2 held that one de-
fendant's jury demand was effective as to the plaintiff-trustee in 
a bankruptcy proceeding who was served with the demand. 1I3 
The jury demand was also effective for the claims against a co-
defendant and cross-claims between the defendants insofar as it 
encompassed issues involving the other defendant.1I4 However, 
beyond that, the second defendant had waived whatever jury 
trial rights that could have been asserted by failing to adhere to 
the requirements of Rule 39(a).1111 
In DeGioia u. United States Lines CO.,1I6 the Second Circuit 
found that a third-party defendant did not waive the right to a 
jury trial by failing to assert its original demand. 1I7 Specifically, 
the district court determined that a jury trial right was still 
binding on an indemnity issue where the named-defendant was 
entitled to indemnification from a third-party defendant. 1I8 The 
Second Circuit affirmed, even though the third-party defendant 
had temporarily acquiesced in not continuing to pursue its origi-
dismiss" and there was no indication that matters at issue would be adjudicated. Mill-
ner, 643 F.2d at 1011. 
50.Id. 
51. Id. at 1011 & n.l. 
52. 639 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1980)(a general jury demand includes issues covered in later 
pleadings because the demander has already told opponent that he wants a jury trial; 
however, this principle does not permit a party to demand a jury trial on issues raised 
subsequently with which he is not connected, nor on issues for which he could not have 
demanded a jury trial in the first place). 
53. Rosen, 639 F.2d at 90. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. See supra note 6 for Rule 39(a) requirements. 
56. 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962)(failure of a third-party defendant to serve a co-
third-party defendant with a copy of the answer containing a claim for jury trial and 
submission of the common issue of liability of both third-party defendants to a jury was 
not prejudicial to the co-third-party defendant, despite actual knowledge and acquies· 
cence to the demand for a jury trial). 
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nal demand for a jury trial. II9 
D. EROSION OF THE PALMER RATIONALE 
1. The Ninth Circuit 
[Vol. 21:53 
Following Palmer, the Ninth Circuit shifted from a literal 
interpretation of Rules 38(d) and 39(a).60 In Reid Bros. Logging 
v. Ketchikan Pulp CO.,61 the Ninth Circuit held that defendant's 
continued efforts to defeat plaintiff's jury demand showed that 
defendant was not relying on his own right to a jury tria1.62 The 
court determined defendant's actions constituted waiver of its 
right to substitute its own jury trial demand for plaintiff's when 
plaintiff withdrew its jury request.6S 
The Ninth Circuit further distanced itself from the literal 
interpretation approach of Palmer in Pope v. Savings Bank of 
Puget Sound.64 Pope was distinguished from Palmer because the 
appellant's conduct was found to be "much more than silence," 
and thus, amounted to waiver of the jury demand. 611 
59.Id. 
60. See White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1990). 
61. 699 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir.)(defendant's consistent efforts to defeat plaintiff's jury 
request demonstrated that defendant was not relying on that request and constituted 
waiver of defendant's right to object when plaintiff eventually withdrew its jury request), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 916 (1983). 
62. Reid Bros. Logging, 699 F.2d at 1304. 
63. Id. at 1303-04. 
64. 850 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1988)(plaintiff's counsel knowingly consented to waiver 
of the right to jury trial because (1) he stated that he was done with the jury; and then 
(2) continued to participate in the trial without objection for over one-and-a-half hours 
after the jury had departed). 
65. Pope, 850 F.2d at 1355. Appellant had informed the district court that he had 
rested "the first part of his case and not the part of the case which [was) to be tried to 
the court on the foreclosure action." Id. The trial judge then informed counsel that he 
would discharge the jury before lunch. After lunch, appellant moved to reconvene the 
jurors, asserting that they had been improperly discharged. Id. The trial judge denied 
the motion and the Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal. Id. at 1354-55. 
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that appellant's conduct was little more than ac-
tual knowledge that the trial court intended to dismiss the jury. However, "the totality 
of the circumstances (t)here manifests that the attorney slept on his client's rights." Id. 
at 1355. The appellant's attorney had unsuccessfully argued that the reason that he had 
not objected to the judge's improper discharge of the jury was that he did not know if it 
was permissible to raise such an objection. Id. However, the appellate panel discounted 
the attorney's argument by determining that one may "not use decorum and respect for 
the court as a double-edged sword to resurrect voluntarily relinquished rights." Id. at 
1355 n.29. 
8
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In contrast to Palmer's literal compliance with Rule 39(a), 
the court in Pope did not discuss the necessity of a stipulation 
withdrawing the jury demand.66 Instead, Palmer was cited for 
the proposition that conduct can evince consent to withdrawal 
and waiver.67 Thus, unlike the circumstances in Palmer, objec-
tion was both proper and necessary to protect a client's impor-
tant right.68 
2. Other Circuits 
Decisions from other circuits illustrate the same dissatisfac-
tion with Palmer that the Ninth Circuit identified in White.69 
For example, the Second Circuit held, in Royal American Man-
agers, Inc. v. IRC Holding CO.,70 that a stock purchaser waived 
his right to a jury trial by participating without objection in a 
bench trial that involved issues not submitted to a jury.71 The 
Seventh Circuit held, in Lovelace v. Dall,72. that an inmate 
waived his previously asserted jury demand because he failed to 
object to a bench trial in a pro se civil action.73 In United States 
v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air,74 claimants in the 
Fourth Circuit waived their right to a jury in a forfeiture pro-
ceeding for two reasons.7~ First, claimants had participated in 
the bench triaP6 Second, claimants had failed to object to the 
66. Id. at 1355. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. See White, 903 F.2d at 703, in which the court discussed this dissatisfaction. 
70. 885 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1989)(participation in a bench trial without objection 
constitutes waiver of a jury trial right). 
71. Royal American Managers, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1018. 
72. 820 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1987)(per curiam}Uudicial economy and fairness to the 
winning party' require that the jury demand waiver rule should be applied to pro se 
parties). 
73. Lovelace, 820 F.2d at 228-29. The Seventh Circuit did concede, however, that 
exceptional circumstances might arise where a pro se litigant's silence during a bench 
trial does not waive the jury demand despite there being no other ground for a remand. 
I d. at 229 n.4. 
74. 777 F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1985)(the right to a jury is waived after making an initial 
demand for a jury trial by participating in a bench trial and failing to object to the 
court's decision to determine factual issues). 
75. Beechcraft, 777 F.2d at 950-51. 
76. Id. at 950-51. Unlike the plaintiff in Millner v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 643 F.2d 
1005 (4th Cir. 1981), who had no notice that the trial court was deciding dispositive 
issues of fact in an evidentiary hearing, in Beechcraft, defendants were clearly aware 
that the district court was planning to decide dispositive issues of fact without a jury. 
Beechcraft, 777 F.2d at 951. 
9
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district court's decision to determine dispositive issues of fact.77 
The Eighth Circuit, in Allen v. Barnes Hospital,78 found that a 
pro se complainant waived the right to a jury trial in a wrongful 
termination suit when objection was not made to submission of 
the case to the judge instead of a jury.79 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. MAJORITY OPINION 
The Ninth Circuit held that a civil litigant's knowing partic-
ipation in a bench trial without objection constituted waiver of a 
timely jury demand.80 The majority acknowledged the Palmer 
standard,81 but explained that subsequent Ninth Circuit cases82 
deviated from Palmer's literal application of Rule 39(a).83 The 
majority also noted a similar approach in other circuits,84 re-
marking that support for the Palmer analysis had become nar-
rowly circumscribed within those circuits.81i 
In overruling Palmer, the Ninth Circuit majority decided 
that Rule 39(a) is designed to protect against some careless 
statement or ambiguous document from being held as a waiver 
when one was not intended.88 However, if the parties have acqui-
esced to a bench trial, the Ninth Circuit will "not upset an oth-
erwise valid bench trial simply because the letter of Rule 39(a) 
has not been followed."87 
77. Beechcraft, 777 F.2d at 951. 
78. 721 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1983)(per curiam)(failure to object to submission of an 
employment action to a judge instead of a jury waived the right to a jury trial). 
79. Allen, 721 F.2d at 644. 
80. White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1990). 
81. Id. at 700. 
82. Reid Bros. Logging v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292, 1303-05 (9th Cir. 
1983); Pope v. Savings Bank of Puget Sound, 850 F.2d 1345, 1355 (9th Cir. 1988). See 
supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text. 
83. FED R. CIV. P. 39(a); see note 6 for expressed language; White, 903 F.2d at 703. 
84. See White, 903 F.2d at 703. The Second and Fourth Circuits also departed from 
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B. CONCURRENCE 
Judge Alarcon, concurring, would have overruled Palmer on 
other grounds, reasoning that if a party were permitted to raise 
the jury trial issue for the first time on appeal, the trial judge 
would be effectively "ambushed."88 He found persuasive the rea-
soning by the Palmer dissent89 that it is dispositive if an issue is 
not preserved for appeal because then it is unnecessary to decide 
whether participation in a bench trial without objection consti-
tutes waiver of a timely jury demand.90 
Judge Alarcon relied on reasoning set forth in Lovelace v. 
Dall91 and Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Weigel92 which sug-
gested that an error asserted on appeal should not be considered 
if a substantive or procedural issue were not raised in the lower 
court since the potential error might have been avoided had the 
issue been previously raised.93 Ultimately, Judge Alarcon agreed 
with the majority's decision94 because the defendant knew a jury 
trial had not been granted.91i However, he noted that the mistake 
had not been brought to the court's attention so there had been 
no opportunity to correct the error.96 By prohibiting correction 
of the error, a litigant would be prevented from asserting an is-
sue on appeal that for strategic reasons he might have intention-
ally ignored in the district court.97 
88. White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699, 704 (Alarcon, J., concurring)(quoting Palmer 
v. United States, 652 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
89. Palmer v. United States, 652 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1981)(Chambers, J., 
dissenting). 
90. White, 903 F.2d at 704. 
91. 820 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1987)(per curiam). See supra note 34 and accompanying 
text. 
92. 426 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1970)(per curiam). See supra note 18 and accompanying 
text. 
93. White, 903 F.2d. at 704. 
94. [d. 
95. [d. 
96. [d. "A party will not be allowed to speculate with the court by letting error go 
unremarked and then seek a new trial on the basis of the error if the outcome of the case 
is unfavorable to him." [d. (quoting 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 2472, at 455 (lst ed. 1971)). 
97. White, 903 F.2d at 705 (citing Partenweederei, MS Belgrano v. Weigel, 313 F.2d 
423,425 (9th Cir. 1962)(per curiam)). This strategy sets the scope of the lawsuit, thereby 
preventing piecemeal litigation and consequent waste of time of both trial and appellate· 
courts. It also gives the appellate court the benefit of the district court's wisdom. [d. 
11
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Diverging from the majority, Judge Alarcon did not perceive 
that White failed to propound a lega:l issue, but rather he failed 
to object to an obvious procedural error.98 Judge Alarcon did not 
believe, nor did the majority suggest, that it had been demon-
strated that justice demanded reversal since White failed to ob-
ject to the absence of a jury.99 Except for Palmer, Judge Alarcon 
was unable to find precedent to support the notion that an issue 
could be raised on appeal when the appellant had known of the 
error but had not objected at the trial court level. loo In affirming 
the district court, Judge Alarcon reasoned that the majority's ra-
tionale might encourage litigants to remain silent in the face of 
clear error, await judgment of the court, and then raise the issue 
on appeal. 101 
C. DISSENT 
The dissent would have reaffirmed Palmer, as it disagreed 
with the majority's approach that preservation of the right to a 
jury trial should not be "formalistic" or "rigid."102 Judge Kozin-
ski for the dissent criticized the majority's opinion as "engraft-
ing a judicially-created exception onto the statutory language"103 
of Rules 38(d) and 39(a).104 
He emphasized that the language of Rules 38(d) and 39(a) is 
clear and unambiguous. 1011 There was neither a written nor oral 
98. White, 903 F.2d at 705. The majority had agreed to consider the merits because 
of its previous ruling that it would entertain legal issues not raised below which were 
purely legal and where the record was fully developed. [d. (citing United States v, 
Gabriel, 625 F.2d 830, 832 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
In, In re Southland Supply, Inc., 657 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1981)(general rule that 
appellate courts will not review issues not objected to at trial except to prevent manifest 
injustice also applies in bankruptcy proceedings appeals), the Ninth Circuit determined 
that it would not review an objection to a trial procedure not raised below "unless neces-
sary to prevent manifest injustice." White, 903 F.2d at 705 (citing In re Southland Sup-
ply, Inc., 657 F.2d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
99. White, 903 F.2d at 705. 
100. [d. 
101. [d. 
102. White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699, 705 (9th Cir. 1990)(Kozinski, J., dissenting, 
with whom Schroeder, J. and Fletcher, J. joined). 
103. [d. 
104. [d. 
105. White, 903 F.2d at 706. A timely jury demand "may not be withdrawn without 
the consent of the parties" and consent may only be expressed either "by written stipu-
lation," or "by an oral stipUlation made in open court and entered on the record." [d. 
12
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stipulation consenting to a bench trial in White. lo6 Thus, the 
dissent opined that the court should have followed the clear 
mandate of the Rules as interpreted by Palmer to reverse the 
district court.I07 
Judge Kozinski asserted that there should be a literal ap-
proach to rules and statutes.I08 He buttressed his arguments l09 
by focusing on other language within Rule 38 which provides 
that the seventh amendment jury trial right shall be strictly pre-
served to the parties.110 The dissent explained that this language 
was to prevent the inadvertent forfeiture of the protections built 
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d) and 39(a». 
Judge Kozinski's reasoning was founded on a recent United States Supreme Court 
case which determined that the process of statutory interpretation starts with the stat-
ute's language. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304, 308 (1989). In Hal/-
strom, the Court held that the language of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
42 U.S.C. section 6972(a)(1) (1988), was explicitly clear that it was mandatory that any 
person must notify the Environmental Protection Agency, in the state in which the viola-
tion of the Act occurred, and the alleged violator must be given 60 days before commenc-
ing the litigation. Id. Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were created by the 
Supreme Court under the Rules Enabling Act (28 U.S.C. § 2072) (1988), the courts are 
required to treat the Federal Rules as they would statutes. Id. See also Bethesda Hosp. 
Ass'n v. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. 1255, 1258 (1988)(administrative regulations governing reim-
bursement of malpractice insurance costs were held valid because strained statutory in-
terpretation by the Secretary was inconsistent with the express language of the statute). 
106. White, 903 F.2d at 706. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. Judge Kozinski cited two recent Supreme Court cases to support that there 
should be a literal approach to rules and statutes. Id. at 706 (citing Hallstrom v. Til-
lamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304 (1988) and Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension 
Fund, 110 S. Ct. 680 (1990)(a constructive trust on union official's pension benefits in 
favor of the union is not warranted, even though the official had embezzled funds from 
the union). "'[I)n the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the proce-
dural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded ad-
ministration of the law.' " Id. (quoting Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304, 
311 (1988), quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980». "[C)ourts should 
be loath to announce equitable exceptions to legislative requirements or prohibitions 
that are unqualified by the statutory text." White, 903 F.2d at 706 (quoting Guidry v. 
Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 110 S. Ct. 680, 687 (1990». 
109. White, 903 F.2d 706. Judge Kozinski conceded that the result in Palmer ap-
peared to be a "triumph of form over substance" in that plaintiff sat silent during the 
proceedings and raised his obj~ction only after the outcome proved unsatisfactory to 
him. However, Judge Kozinski believed that the majority's flexible interpretation of the 
rule in response to apparent exigencies of a particular case could work greater unfairness 
upon larger numbers of litigants. Id. 
110. Id. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a) states in pertinent part: "[T)he right of trial by jury as 
declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution ... shall be preserved to the 
parties inviolate."(emphasis added). 
13
Leney: Civil Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991
66 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:53 
into Rules 38 and 39 and the constitutional right to a jury trial 
itself.lll 
Judge Kozinski noted that the defendant as well as the 
plaintiff, could have informed the district court of its error.ll2 
He emphasized that defendant was represented by counsel at all 
times, and knew the plaintiff had requested a jury.1I3 Therefore, 
he argued that deprivation of plaintiff's rights was not entirely 
plaintiff's fault, as the majority and concurrence concluded. 114 
Judge Kozinski conceded that by reaffirming Palmer, as he 
proposed, the Ninth Circuit would be alone in adhering to the 
literal language of Rules 38(d) and 39(a).1l6 However, he noted 
several previous Ninth Circuit decisions bolstered his position. lIS 
Judge Kozinski emphasized that the Ninth Circuit's en banc 
decision in United States u. Fernandez-Angulo,ll7 which was 
decided immediately prior to White, supported his analysis. lIS 
In Fernandez-Angulo, it was held that a remand for resentenc-
ing was required when a district court failed to make findings 
111. White, 903 F.2d at 706. 
112. [d. 
113. [d. Judge Kozinski also suggested that the elementary research by the defend-




116. [d. Judge Kozinski cited the following cases as partial support for his argu-
ment: Purba v. INS, 884 F.2d 515, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1989)(a deportation hearing had to be 
physically "before" an immigration judge). United States v. Buzard, 884 F.2d 475, 475-76 
(9th Cir. 1989)(courts lack authority to extend time for filing notice of appeal under FED. 
R. App. P. 4(b) upon a showing of "excusable neglect"). Buzard was rendered because 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 49(c) expressly states that a clerk's failure to notify a party of entry of 
judgment is no excuse. White, 903 F.2d at 707. 
Also, United States v. Eccles, 850 F.2d 1357, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1988), held that the 
government was not permitted to pursue an interlocutory appeal of a suppression ruling 
unless the certificate required in 18 U.S.C. § 3731 was filed on time. United States v. 
Avendano-Camacho, 786 F.2d 1392, 1394 (9th Cir. 1986), exemplified that deadlines for 
filing notice of appeal were mandatory, and an exception could not be created for attor-
ney neglect. 
Further, in International Ass'n of Ironworkers' Local Union 75 v. Madison Indus., 
733 F.2d 656, 658-59 (9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth Circuit upheld the rule that 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 required notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days of judgment on the merits even 
though attorneys' fees remained unresolved. Finally, in United States v. Armored Trans., 
Inc., 629 F.2d 1313,1316-17 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981), FED. R. 
CRIM P. 6(g) was literally construed to require that the grand jury's term was to begin on 
the impanelment date, regardless of the first day of service. 
117. United States v. Fernandez-Angulo, 897 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1990)(en bane). 
118. White, 903 F.2d at 707. 
14
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pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(D).1l9 The Ninth Circuit 
rejected a "practical interpretation" that would have avoided re-
sentencing because such a determination would have also 
glossed over the specific language and clear mandate of the 
Rule.120 
Judge Kozinski's principal criticism of the majority's analy-
sis centered on the injustice a plaintiff would suffer by relying 
on Palmer.121 He argued that the majority's approach was not 
only inconsistent with Fernandez-Angulo, but also raised serious 
questions as to the proper method of interpreting and applying 
federal rules of procedure in the Ninth Circuit.122 Contrary to 
Fernandez-Angulo, which held Rule 32's plain language bind-
ing,123 White u. McGinnis, through a different en bane panel of 
judges, treated the literal language of Rules 38 and 39 as little 
more than obstacles to be overcome in depriving plaintiff of his 
constitutional right to a jury trial. 124 
119. United States v. Fernandez-Angulo, 897 F.2d at 1515-16. After appellant Fer-
nandez-Angulo pled guilty, a pre-sentence report was prepared stating that he was ex-
perienced in the drug t~ade and had initiated the negotiations leading to the crimes to 
which he had pled guilty. At sentencing, the district court failed: (1) to resolve the dis-
puted factual matters; (2) to state that the contested factual matters would not be taken 
into account in sentencing the defendant; and (3) to append to the presentence report a 
written record of any findings or determinations which resolved the controverted mat-
ters. [d. at 1515. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(D) provides: 
If the comments of the defendant and defendant's counselor 
testimony or other information introduced by them allege any 
factual inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report or 
the summary of the report or part thereof, the court shall, as 
to each matter controverted, make (i) a finding as to the alle-
gation, or (ii) a determination that no such finding is neces-
sary because the matter controverted will not be taken into 
account in sentencing. A written record of such findings and 
determinations shall be appended to and accompany any copy 
of the presentence investigation report thereafter made availa-
ble to the Bureau of Prisons. 
120. See Fernandez-Angulo, 897 F.2d at 1516, in which the Ninth Circuit asserted, 
"[s)trict compliance with the rule is required." [d. While noting that other circuits had 
split on the question, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "the brightline [it) adopt[ed) 
imposes no onerous burden on district courts and is most faithful to the language of the 
Rule." [d. 
121. White, 903 F.2d at 708. Plaintiff-appellant White "discharged fully" the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure and the law of the Ninth Circuit in securing his right to a 
jury trial. [d. 
122. [d. 
123. 897 F.2d at 1515-16. 
124. White, 903 F.2d at 708. Both White and Fernandez-Angulo involved a defend-
15
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V. CRITIQUE 
The holding in White v. McGinnis presents a danger. If 
Rules 38 and 39 are interpreted non-literally, courts may liber-
ally construe other rules and statutes in the name of substance 
over procedure. 
More significantly,. the holding creates uncertainty as to 
whether the Ninth Circuit will follow a liberal or literal applica-
tion of a given procedural rule. Such confusion will likely pro-
duce a flurry of unnecessary appeals premised on inconsistent 
statutory and constitutional interpretation. 
Notably, White was the first Ninth Circuit court case that 
did not involve affirmative conduct amounting to a stipulation of 
jury trial waiver.l2G The plaintiff's conduct in White, according 
to the majority, was "nothing more than silence"126 because he 
did not actively participate in the bench trial. 127 
The majority regarded White as an opportunity, therefore, 
to align the Ninth Circuit with the case law of its sister circuits. 
ant's failure to call the district court's attention to its noncompliance with procedural 
rules. White 903 F.2d at 708 n.4. The dissent stressed that the Ninth Circuit should 
conform to its own guiding principals rather than those of other circuits, reasoning that 
the rules pertaining to trial conduct can differ somewhat among circuits, even among 
districts, without creating unfairness for the litigants in either jurisdiction according to 
the dissent. [d. at 708. However, unfairness arises where settled rules change within a 
jurisdiction. [d. The dissent also asserted that adhering to the rule set down in Palmer 
would have minimal impact since waiver of the right to a civil jury trial had not come up 
on appeal in the Ninth Circuit since Palmer in 1981, and only 14 appellate decisions 
nationwide had raised this issue in the previous 41 years. [d. 
125. White, 903 F.2d 699, 708 (9th Cir. 1990). In both Reid Bros. Logging v. Ketch-
ikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 916 (1983), and Pope v. 
Savings Bank of Puget Sound, 850 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1988), the respective parties 
waived the right to trial by jury by performing affirmative acts which formed part of the 
trial record and which the court could plausibly interpret as an oral or written stipula-
tion. White, 903 F.2d at 703. 
In Pope, the plaintiff knowingly consented to waiver of the right to a jury trial 
where counsel stated that he was done with the jury. White, 903 F.2d at 708. In Reid 
Bros. Logging, defendant's consistent efforts to defeat plaintiff's jury request, i.e. filing a 
motion to strike the jury demand in an appearance before the district court judge, 
demonstrated that defendant was not relying on that request and constituted a waiver of 
the defendant's rights to object when plaintiff eventually determined to withdraw its 
jury request. White, F.2d at 708. 
126. White, 903 F.2d at 699-700. 
127. [d. 
16
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For that reason, the majority rejected the formalistic approach 
to civil jury trial waiver advanced by Palmer and adopted a 
"nothing more than silence" definition of plaintiff's conduct, to 
significantly modify the meaning of Rules 38(d) and 39(a).128 
Seemingly, this remedy was fashioned to halt the potential pro-
cedural abuse by a party who could unsuccessfully argue the 
merits of his case, but then unjustly avail himself of another op-
portunity to present the substantive issues in another forum. 
Our legal system militates against relitigation of claims and 
issues which have been tried and decided.129 However, an 
equally compelling policy dictates that to implement Congress's 
specific intent, it is the statute's specific language, and interpre-
tation of rules based on congressional statutes, that should 
govern. ISO 
Appellate decisions should not be based on whether a 
purely legal issue was raised and whether the record was fully 
developed, as the majority in White required. l31 As Judge Alar-
con suggested in his concurring opinion, if an issue is not raised 
at trial, it ordinarily should not be argued on appeal. 132 This is 
the most balanced approach to the dilemma courts face when a 
party appears accidentally or purposefully to rely on a proce-
dural error to gain a substantive advantage. 133 Adherence to this 
established policy preserves expectations that rules and statutes 
will be construed in a strict, literal, and consistent manner.13' 
Failure to object should waive the issue on appeal, whether 
for jury trial or other error. l3Ii This approach is clearly the most 
practical from the standpoint of judicial economy. Litigants 
would then be obligated to remedy error in the trial court where 
the case had originated. 
128. Id. 
129. See Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948), for a more 
complete discussion of res judicata. 
130. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 108 
(1980)(the starting point for interpreting statutory language should be the statute itself). 
131. White, 903 F.2d at 700 nA (citing United States v. Gabriel, 625 F.2d 830, 832 
(9th Gir. 1980)). 
132. Id. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
133. White, 903 F.2d at 700 nA. 
134. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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The dissenting opinion in White, if ever adopted, also 
presents a potential danger. The dissent in White concluded 
that it is the defendant's as well as the plaintiff's obligation to 
raise the trial court's procedural error. IS6 The dissent disagreed 
with creating an exception to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. ls7 Also, it appeared to advance the proposition that both 
parties might have the duty to inform the trial court of its pro-
cedural error under pain of reversal on appeal. IS8 Such a sugges-
tion undermines the principle of adversarial confrontation. 
The Ninth Circuit in White, by overturning Palmer, did 
align itself with other circuits. 139 However, Palmer's demise is 
inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's history of strict and literal 
adherence to rules and statutes.140 White also conflicts with 
United States Supreme Court cases which discourage judicial ex-
ceptions· that are contrary to procedural requirements specified 
by the legislature. 141 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit in White u. McGinnis 142 established an 
inconsistent basis of literal/non-literal interpretation of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. The court attempted to fashion a 
136. White, 903 F.2d at 707. 
137. I d. at 705-06. 
138. See White, 903 F.2d at 707. 
139. See Wool v. Real Estate Exch., 179 F.2d 62, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1949)(where counsel 
for defendant acquiesced in action of the trial judge in dismissing the jury after some of 
the evidence was in and then proceeding to decide the case himself as an equity judge, 
alleged right to a jury trial was waived); Allen v. Barnes Hosp., 721 F.2d 643, 643-44 (8th 
Cir. 1983)(see supra note 78 and accompanying text); Lovelace v. Dall, 820 F.2d 22:3, 
227 -28 (7th Cir. 1987)(see supra note 34 and accompanying text); Sewell v. Jefferson 
County Fiscal Court, 863 F.2d 461, 464-66 (6th Cir. 1988)(by failing to object at time 
trial court granted motion to continue jury trial or remove case from jury trial docket 
and continue case for trial before the judge, plaintiff waived right to a jury trial), cert. 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 75 (1989); Southland Reship, Inc. v. Flegel, 534 F.2d 639, 643-44 (.5th 
Cir. 1976)(at hearing where defense counsel stated that jury trial had been requested on 
damage claims, only right to jury trial on liability issues was waived); United States v. 
1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air, 777 F.2d 947, 950-51 (4th Cir. 1985)(see supra 
note 74 and accompanying text); Royal Am. Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 
F.2d lOll, 1018-19 (2d Cir. 1989)(see supra note 70 and accompanying text). 
140. White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d at 706. 
141. Id. at 707 (citing Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, llO S. Ct. at 311 quoting 
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980». See also Guidry v. Sheet Metal 
Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 110 S. Ct. 680 (1990). 
142. 903 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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remedy to prevent the party from utilizing the trial court's pro-
cedural error to realize a substantive windfall,143 and to conform 
with the approach taken by sister circuits. However, a litigant's 
perception of how the court will interpret procedural rules will 
be most assuredly obscured by this decision. 
Portions of the majority's opinion suggest evolution from a 
formalistic approach to preserving the jury trial right. 144 How-
ever, the strict adherence to procedural requirements promul-
gated most notably by the Ninth Circuit in United States u. 
Fernandez-Angulo,!46 and by the Supreme Court in Hallstrom 
u. Tillamook County 146 and Guidry u. Sheet Metal Workers Na-
tional Pension Fund,147 seems likely to generate new controver-
sies in which the courts will debate to what extent, if any, rules 
of procedure should be followed literally and take precedence 
over substance. 
Herber Carlton Leney, Jr. * 
143. White, 903 F.2d at 700. Plaintiff knowingly participated in a bench trial and 
then appealed the adverse verdict, based on non-waiver of his jury trial rights. [d. 
144. [d. at 701-03. 
145. 897 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1990)(en bane). See supra notes 117-24 and accompa-
nying text. 
146. 110 S. Ct. 304 (1989). See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text. 
147. 110 S. Ct. 680 (1990). See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of December 1991. 
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